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Member of California and Illinois Bars; engaged in private practice in Pars,
France.
A\RTICLE 1142 of the Code Napoleon declares that "[e]very obli-
gation to do or not to do shall be resolved in damages in case of
non-performance by the obligor." Specific performance, the draftsmen
seemed to say, is not to be had where a contract imposes this kind of
obligation. But Article 1142 was arguably intended and has certainly
been interpreted, primarily as an expression of the maxim nemo potest
praecse -cogz ad factum which in turn could be seen as prohibiting the
use of force to compel performance rather than as the consecration of
a damages-only rule on remedies.' The courts and doctrinal writers
were in agreement that m principle the disappointed promisee was
entitled to performance where it could be obtained without physical
coercion.
2
The difficulty lay not in the principle but in its implementation.
French courts d6 not possess the power to fine or imprison the con-
temnors of their civil judgments.3 Their sole weapon is the judgment
[Ed. Note- The Hastings International & Comparative Law Review assumes all respon-
sibility for any mistakes in the footnotes. Due to a mail strike in France,
the author was unable to approve the final version.]
1. On the intention see Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany,
57 MicH. L. REv. 495, 509-11 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Dawson]. For the interprcta-
tion, see, e.g., 7 PLANIOL et RUPERT, TnArri' PRATIQUE Lr Ti sEouQUE Dn Dnorr CIVIL
FNc~As (2d ed. 1954) §§ 780, 820; 2.1 MARTY et RAYNAuiD, Dnorr CIVIL. L,,
OLICATIONS § 663 (1962); Kadouch c. Pfeifle (Cass.civ.3e, 19 fiv. 1970) 1970 Bull.
Civ.III 90 [90.1 Gaz.Pal. 1970. I. 282].
2. The "principle" is sometimes attributed to arts. 1143 and 1144 of the Civil Code
which provide that the creditor of an obligation "to do or not to do" may be authorized
to perform the obligation himself or have it performed by another at the debtor's expense.
See 1 ENYCLO. DALLOZ DE LA PROCE.DURE CiviLE Er CoMNtmrnciAitx 937 (1955).
3. Imprisonment for debt at the instance of the creditor existed for a time but was
eliminated by statute in 1867. Law of 22 juillet 1867, Loi relative a la contrainte par
corps, [1867], Duv. 165 at 190. The 1954 proposal of the Civil Code Reform Commission
would have (i) empowered the luge des rdfgres to order the performance of obligations
"to do" under pain of astremnte, which is a civil fine payable to the State, and (ii) al-
lowed the judge to fine or imprison for contempt of court (disruptions, insults, threats,
etc.) but not for failure to execute a judgment. Commission de RWorme du Code de
Procedure Civile, arts. 93 and 348, pp. 43 and 83 (1954). On the juge des rdfdres, see
HERzoG, CIvIL PRoCEDuRE IN FRANCE 329-30, 238-39 (1965).
.[93]
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itself adorned with an executory clause (formule d' exe'cution) ad-
dressed to the hussiers de justice and officers of the police and gen-
darmerie ordering them to lend their assistance in its execution. ' The
execution of a money judgment is accomplished by levy on the debtor's
property and a subsequent judicial sale. 5 If the judgment requires the
debtor to deliver specific moveable property, the performance of this
obligation "to do" can similarly be accomplished through seizure of
the property by the hussier with the assistance, if needed, of the
police.0 The need alone does not suffice to assure police assistance,
4. The text of the formule ex~cutoire is prescribed by the Decree of 12 jun 3 1947,.
[1947] J.O. 5487 ([1947] B.L.D.496; [1947] S.L.A.942) as amended by Decree no.
58-1289 of 22 dec. 1958, [1958] J.O.11608, ([1959] B.L.D. 58). The hufssior do
justice is an oflicier ministeriel who is both an official and a representative of the person
in whose behalf he is called upon to act. His functions include the service (signification)
of legal documents and the execution of civil judgments. One(. a record is made of his
witnessing an event or condition, the matter is virtually incontestable in a legal pro-
ceeding. See generally, HEnzoc, supra note 3, at 92-97.
5. The principle forms of execution, the saisie-ex6cution (movables) and the salsle-
immobili&e (immovables), are governed respectively by arts. 583-625 and 673-717 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. See generally, VINCENT, VoIns ' ExECUTIoN (11th cd,,
1974).
6. This is an area of considerable confusion. The doctrinal writers are quite clear
that one entitled to the possession of property may obtain its delivery or surrender and
that police assistance should be available to accomplish this by force if necessary. Soe,
e.g., Deprez, Distinction des obligations'de donner, de faire et de ne pas faire, Jous-
CLASSEUaR CIVIL, arts. 1136-45, fascicule 1 (1964). But the mechanism Is obscure, The
duty to'transfer title to property (an obligation "to give" rather than to do, C. Civ. arts.
1136-41), for example, is discharged by operation of the principle set out in art. 1038
of. the Civil Code (and elsewhere in respect of other kinds of transfers) whereby agree-
ment alone transfers ownership. But even where that principle does not operate the
court may accomplish the transfer of title by the judgment itself (see id. at § 48) or
may appoint a judicial administrator to accomplish the acts necessary for transfer in the
name of the transferor. See, e.g., Kadouch c. Pfeifle, supra note 1. With title transfer
accomplished, the owner must still obtain possession. In respect of the purchase of
spedific movables, art. 1610 of the Civil Code recognizes the buyer's right to bring an
action to be "put in possession." See Martin de ]a Moutte, Les Sanctions de l'obligatlon
de delivrance in HAMEL, ed., LA VENTE COMMERCIALE DE MARCHIANDISES at 187 (1951).
Apart from this explicit provision, the specific performance of the obligation to deliver
movables seems to result entirely from the general proposition ;hat specific performance
is preferred where practicable. The delivery of movables is the paradigm case in which
compulsory performance, if the goods are identified, will normally be both practical and
inoffensive. Doctrinal explanation of the right to be put in possession tends to be brief,
mysterious and, to some never very precise degree, reliant upon the group of real actions
for the enforcement of rights of ownership which appear to provide another basis for
"specific performance" of obligations to deliver or surrender property. See, eg., 7
PLANIOL et RiPERT, supra note 1 at § 779. The action in revindication of movables Is
implied from art. 2279 of the Civil Code whose celebrated rule that "possession amounts
to title" where movables are concerned creates some difficulty for the enforcement of
duties to deliver movables by this avenue. See, e.g., 2 Auniy ct RAu, DRlor CIVIL
FnANcms 171-72 (7th ed., by Esmein, 1961). The other real actions include the action
in revindication of immovables (id., at 505-518) and the possessory actions regulated
by arts. 23-27 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are, however, of doubtful utility
in assuring effective transfer to a new owner.
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despite the language of the executory formula. There has long been
a notorious reluctance on the part of the administrative authorities to
provide police assistance in the execution of civil judginents.7 Where
the performance ordered is not the delivery or surrender of property,
the problem of the availability of coercive forces rejoin that of the
legitimacy of such coercion in light of Article 1142. Using force to
separate a debtor from property is one thing; compelling him by phys-
ical coercion to perform some agreed task is quite another. For, as it
is customarily explained, to do so would infringe his liberty.,
The problem of specifie performance of contracts in France was
thus twofold. On the one hand, it was a matter of finding a substitute
for coercion where the requisite State assistance was not forthcoming.
On the other hand, it was to devise a form of compulsion or induce-
ment capable of reaching at least some of those situations in which
direct coercion was excluded either by Article 1142 or by broader
scruples not unlike those which have led Common Law jurisdictions
to refuse to order the specific performance of personal service con-
tracts.9 A solution had to be built around the money judgment, the
only sanction available to the courts. The Civil Code itself offered one
possibility: the contractual penalty fixing a liability in excess of prob-
able damage in case of failure to perform. The other approach, the
astreinte, was devised by the courts without statutory support. Both
methods rely on the threat of a money judgment substantially exceed-
ing provable damage. Both have been the subject of recent legislation
which, with the evolution of the case law on the astreinte, has sub-
stantially changed what may be called the law of specific performance
in France.
I. JUDICIAL COMPULSION: THE ASTREINTE
The astreinte is a money judgment imposing upon the non-perform-
ing debtor a liability of a fixed amount per day (or month or year)
for every day which passes without performance by the debtor after
the date fixed by the judgment. As it was shaped by the case law and
the doctrinal writers, the astreinte might be either "definitive" or
"provisional." In either case, a further judicial decision was required
7. See, e.g., CALBAICU, L" exicution des decitions de justice, [1947] Djur.85;
MARTY et RAYNAUD, supra note 1, at 684; and the legislative history dimmussed infra
at note 32.
8. MARTY et RAYNAUD, supra note 1, at 684.
9. E.g., the artist who refuses to perform a commission to paint a portrait. Rosa
Bonheur c. Pourehet (Cour Imp~riale de Paris, 4 July 1865) 1865 D.2.202.
Isse
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to "liquidate" it by fixing the cumulative amount before execution
could be obtained. The definitive astreinte took the form of a final
judgment whose "liquidation" involved nothing more than a simple
multiplication operation. The provisional astreinte, on the other hand,
was not cast as a final judgment and was subject to revision by the
judge at the time of liquidation. On the basis of a further examina-
tion of the circumstances, extenuating and otherwise, surrounding the
debtor's failure to perform, the provisional astreinte could be liquidated
at an amount quite different from that originally fixed. The utility of
the device in either form as a means of compelling performance ob-
viously depends in very large part upon credibility of the threat to
impose a financial liability on the debtor greater than that to which
lie would be subjected by a judgment awarding actual damages to
the creditor. The central problem in the development of the astreinte
was precisely whether a civil tribunal could ever impose liability for
a sum in excess of actual damages. 10
During the early development of the astreinte the focus was else-
where, principally upon the question of the source of the judicial power
to order performance under astreinte." Moreover, the problem of the
propriety of imposing a penalty in excess of damages, recoverable by
one 6f the parties to a civil lawsuit, was partially masked by the tend-
ency of the courts to call the sum thus awarded "damages."", When at
last it was squarely confronted with the question, the Court of Cassa-
tion refused to sustain an astreinte whose liquidated amount was ad-
mittedly in excess of the lower court's finding of actual damage."8
10. The literature on the astreinte is extensive. In addition to the treatises mentioned
in the preceding notes and Professor Dawson's excellent description of the institution
and its development prior to 1959, supra note 1, see L'Astreinte in 1 ENCYCL. DALLOZ I
Dtorr CIVIL (1974) for an extensive treatment accompanied by a useful bibliography,
11. See Dawson, supra note 1, at 513-14. The question of the source of judicial
authority to impose the astreinte never much troubled the courts themselves and the
doctrine finally came to accept the theory of inherent power, reinforced by a reference
to judicial "orders" in an obscure article of the Code of Civil Procedure (art. 1036),
advanced by Esmein in a celebrated article, L'Origine et la loglque de la Jurisprudence
en matiare d" astreinte, [1903] REVUE TinlIESTnlELLE DE DIOIuT CIVIL 5 [hereinafter
cited as REv. Da. Civ.]. The Esmein rationale is reflected in the modem case law of
the Court of Cassation. See, e.g., Adam c. Marino (Cass.civ., 26 avril 1968) [1968)
Bull.Civ.III.137 ([1968] D. Jur. 526). The other principal difficulty had to do with the
question whether a judge could revise his own earlier judgment for purposes of "liqui-
dating" the astreinte without violating the rule of res judicata. The difficulty was over-
come merely by recognizing the provisional character of the earlier judgment. Sea
Dawson, supra note 1, at 513.
12. See EsMmN, supra note 11, at 13-19.
13. Galbrun c. Durand (Cass.civ., 14 mars 1927) [1927] D. Jur. 274;
c. _ (Cass.civ., 27 f6v. 1953) [1953] S. Jur. 1. 196. It is generally believed
that the hardening of the Court of Cassation's insistence on the actual damage standard
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However, the Court refused to condemn the unliquidated, provisional
astreinte regardless of its amount. It was, after all, only provisional.
Judges were entitled to threaten financial disaster in order to procure
the performance of an obligation, but they must not fulfill the threat.
They were required to demonstrate in their decision the correlation
between the actual damage and the liability ultimately imposed. This
state of affairs led Professor Dawson, in his 1959 study of specific per-
formance in France and Germany, to conclude that the promissee's
entitlement in principle to performance "is almost wholly meaningless
where the astreinte is the only means employed for its realization."'"
Despite the restrictions imposed by the Court of Cassation, the
astreinte survived, illustrating the need for such a device to compel
contract performance. Apart from its effects on the timid or ill-advised
litigant, the astriente undoubtedly preserved a certain force to the ex-
tent that it suggested that the judge who imposed the astreinte might
later solace himself and the disappointed litigant with an exaggerated,
but difficult to contest, damage award if performance was not forth-
coming.' 5 Some judges were prepared to order provisional execution
on goods which were being held under judicial control pending the
final judgment awarding damages.1" These developments essentially
undermined the rule imposed by the Court of Cassation. That court's
ability to exert control over damage assessments by the lower courts
is very limited, so long as their decisions evidenced meticulous adher-
ence to the norms the court announced. It is difficult to assess the
force and utility the astreinte retained under these circumstances. It
was obvious that the astreinte was not what it purported to be and
any well-advised obligor willing to risk such exaggeration of damages
as the circumstances and judicial discretion might support had little
to lose by ignoring it.
Such was the situation in 1959, when the utility of the astreinte
reached its lowest point. The same year saw the beginning of its ren-
which occurred in the early 1950's was a reflection of the legislative condemnation of
the use of the astreinte to expel hold-over tenants from leased premises during the
critical housing shortage of the early post-World War II years. Law of July 21, 1949.
Dommages-Int&ts-Astreintes, [1949] J.O.7183 ([1949] B.L.D. 755); and see Raynaud,
La Distinction de rastreinte et des dommages-intdrfts dns la jurisprudence frangalse
ricente, MLANGEs SECRE'AN 249 at 251 (1964) and Dawson, supra note 1, at 519-21.
14. Dawson, supra note 1, at 524-25.
15. The doctrinal writers had no doubt that the courts willingly used their margin
of appreciation in the assessment of damages at the time of the liquidation of the pro-
visional astreinte to increase the burden on the recalcitrant debtor. See, e.g., L'Astreinte,
supra note 10, at § 15.
16. See Fr~javille, La Valeur Pratique de lAstreinte, [1951) J.C.P. 910; and
Dawson, supra note 1, at 521-22.
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aissance. On October 20, 1959, the Court of Cassation decided a case
in which the Court of Appeals of Rioms'" had imposed an astreinte of
10,000 old Francs per day for a period of three months or until the
defendant had performed the modification of an industrial installation
which encroached on plaintiff's property. When the defendant com-
pany failed to perform, the plaintiff demanded liquidation of the first
astreinte, and the imposition of a new and more severe astreinte. The
Court of Appeals acceded to the plaintiff's request and awarded judg-
ment for 900,000 old Francs in liquidation of the first astreinte. De-
fendant brought a pourvoi alleging that the Court of Appeals had erred
in awarding a judgment not based on actual damage. The Court of
Cassation refused to overrule the Court of Appeals. It declared that
the provisional astreinte is a means of compulsion entirely distinct from
damages. The liquidated amount of the astreinte should be determined,
as the Rioms Court had done, by taking into account the circumstances
aggravating or extenuating the recalcitrant debtor's refusal to perform,
such as the seriousness of his fault and his resources. In essence, the
astreinte must be made to hurt if it is to have the desired result.'"
The October 20, 1959 decision opened the way to the effective use
of the provisional astreinte for procurement of specific performance
of contractual obligations as well as for the execution of other judicial
orders. At the same time, it aggravated the confusion surrounding the
distinction between the provisional and the definitive astreinte. The
October 20, 1959 decision bore uniquely on the provisional astreinte,
i.e., the astreinte ordered by a decision which only becomes executory
after a process of liquidation in which the circumstances and the
resources of the debtor have been reconsidered and the amount to
be paid recalculated in light of that reconsideration. The definitive
astreinte, pronounced without possibility of revision, remained subject
to the actual damage rule. Notwithstanding the additional coercive
power which might have been attached to an astreinte were the rate
not open to further revision by the court, only the provisional astreinte
was recognized as a coercive technique within the compass of the
October 20, 1959 decision. A condition of the imposition of an astreinte,
where the liquidated amount exceeds provable damage, was that the
debtor have an opportunity to perform and that his liability for delay
or refusal to perform be finally determined only after that opportunity
17. Pradon c. Soci6t6 de production d'6nergie 61ectrique de ]a Sioule (Ct. App.
Rioms) see nbte 18, infra for review by the Court of Cassation.
18. Soci6t6 de production d'6nergie 6lectrique de ]a Sioule c. Pradon (Cnss.civ.ire,
20 oct. 1959) [1959] Bull.civ.I.910 [1959] S. Jur.III 225.
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has passed. The liquidation of an astreinte which did not satisfy that
condition could only be compensatory and not coercive. The definitive
astreinte, also, required increased coercive power. The Court of Cassa-
tion practically invited the lower courts to camouflage the penalty as
a damage award. It held that the underlying assessment of damages
for delay was an issue of fact within the discretion of the court im-
posing the definitive astreinte and not subject to review. 10 The 1959
decision initiated a jurisprudential development which was to be
codified and completed by legislative action in 1972.
The 1972 legislation on the astreinte began as a private member
bill introduced in the National Assembly by two law professor Deputies,
Jean Foyer and Pierre Mazeaud.20 No action was taken on their bill,
but, when Foyer and Mazeaud were appointed co-reporters for the
National Assembly committee examining a government bill on civil
procedure, they took the opportunity to reintroduce their proposal as
an amendment to the government bill.2 ' Essentially, the proposal con-
firmed the case law of the Court of Cassation on the provisional
ostreinte which had, since the 1959 decision, (i) confirmed the power
of the courts to order an astreinte not limited by the amount of actual
damage suffered by the plaintiff,22 (ii) recognized that this power was
exercisable by the court on its own initiative,2 3 and (iii) held that,
being independent of damages and essentially a means of assuring
compliance with a judicial order, the astrqinte could be liquidated by
the judge who had ordered it even if that judge were incompetent to
decide the damage issue.2 4 The Foyer-Mazeaud proposal also recog-
nized the coercive utility of the definitive astreinte and authorized the
imposition of a definitive astreinte free of the actual damage limita-
tion.2 5 Finally, Foyer and Mazeaud sought to moderate the private
19. Lamare c. Prevost (Cass.civ.lire, 4 nov. 1959) [1959] Bull. Civ. 1.381. On the
definitive astreinte after 1959 see generally Rassat, L'Astreinte definitive, [1967]J.C.P.I.
2069.
20. Proposition de loi relative i l astreinte en matiare civile, Assembl6e nationale,
Doe. no. 1658, Premiere session ordinaire 1970-71.
21. See Rapport fait au nor de In Commission des lois, etc., Assembl6e nationale
Doe. no. 2447, Seconde session ordinaire 1971-72 [hereinafter cited as A.N. 2447].
22. Proposed amendment no. 19, id. at 29, essentially incorporating the Court of
Cassation's decision of 20 oct. 1959, supra note 18.
23. Proposed amendment no. 18, A.N. 2447 at 28. The Court of Cassation adopted
the same position in Adam c. Marino (Cass.civ.3e, 26 avril 1968) [1968] BuU.Civ.II.
137 ([1968] D. 526).
24. Proposed amendment no. 20, A.N. 2447 at 29, and see Administration des
Douanes c. Socodemix (Cass.ass.pl6n. 13 mai 1966) [1966] Bull.Civ.11I.3 ([1966]
J.C.P.I. 14786).
25. Proposed amendment no. 19, A.N. 2447 at 29. For the contrary position of the
Court of Cassation, see authorities cited supra note 19.
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penalty problem, and, incidentally, assist judges who were hesitant to
apply a measure which seemed unjustly to enrich one party to a civil
action.26 They proposed that the amount recovered from the defendant
in execution of an astreinte be paid half to the private plaintiff and
half to the public treasury.27
The government supported the Foyer-Mazeaud proposal,2 8 and, in-
sofar as it confirmed and provided a statutory basis for existing judicial
practice, it encountered no serious resistance in the -legislative process.
However, the 6onsecration of the definitive astreinte and the proposal
to- split the- proceeds between the plaintiff beneficiary of the astreinte
and the public treasury ran into strong opposition in the Senate.
Against the definitive astreinte it was argued that the increased co-
ercive power derived from the imposition of an estreinte at a rate not
subject to revision was more than counter-balanced by the likelihood
that substantial injustice would result in many cases if the judge were
not free to redetermine the amount of the astreinte in light of all the
circumstances surrounding the failure to execute the court's order.2
Against the proposed allocation of a portion of the proceeds of the
astreinte to the State in recognition of its penal character, it was argued
that since the astreinte was made necessary by the refusal of the ad-
ministration to supply the force required to compel compliance with-
out an astreinte, it would be paradoxical to allocate a portion of the
proceeds of the astreinte to the public treasury.8 31
The National Assembly sought to soften Senate opposition by
amending the bill to allow the judge to determine in his discretion an
appropriate allocation of the proceeds of the astreinte between the
party and the State. Additionally the State's share would be allocated
to the National Solidarity Fund, a specially funded institution which
provides certain benefits to the aged and retired persons. 81 The Senators
were unimpressed. The disagreement was finally compromised by the
26. See A.N. 2447 at 12.
27. Proposed amendment No. 22, A.N. 2447 at 29.
28. [1972] Journal Offliciel, id. D~bats parlementaires - Assemblhe nationalo 2811
[hereinafter cited as J.O.A.N.], remarks of M. Pleven, Minister of Justice.
29. [1972] Journal Officiel, 6d. D~bats parlementaires - S4nat 1367, 1370 and 1424
[hereinafter cited as J.O.S.], remarks of M. Bellegou, reporter for the Senate committee
charged with the examination of the bill.
30. [1972] J.O.S. 1371, remarks of M. Bellegou and the apparent recognition by
M. Pleven of the "paradox."
31. [1972] J.O.A.N. 3014. The Fonds national de solidaritd was established In 1950
to provide certain benefits, e.g., pension supplements, to elderly persons to complement
those available under the general Social Security program. See C.S6c.Soc. arts. L684-
L711 and Decree no. 56-733, as amended. C.S6c.Soc. arts. L705-712 (Petits Codes
Dalloz, ed. 1974).
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Senate's acceptance of the definitive astreinte and the National As-
sembly's abandonment of the proposal to allocate a portion of astreinte
proceeds to the public treasury.
3 2
Apparently, it was never suggested that the astreinte ought to be
regarded as a form of constraint designed to reinforce the authority of
the judge by a method inherently preferable to police intervention,
making recovery of the amount of the astreinte by the State as a civil
fine quite appropriate, whether or not it is also seen as rewarding the
State for its failure to assist in the enforcement of civil judgments.
Indeed, the Senate's rapporteur viewed the proposed allocation of a
portion of the proceeds to the State as the upper end of a slippery
slope toward the introduction of a civil fine. He pleaded 'let us not
introduce the notion of punitive sanction (penalit) into the relations
between private litigants."3 3 On this view, it is of no relevance that
punitive sanctions already exist, since the penalty clause and the
astreinte as traditionally conceived were incorporated in the portions
of the bill accepted by-the Senate, for so long as the penalty is not paid
to the State, the essentially private character of the relationship be-
tween civil litigants and the purely umpireal role of the State and its
courts is preserved. The strong attachment, especially of the bar, to
this concept of civil justice tends to inhibit reform not only in such
matters but more particularly in the effort to modernize the system
of civil procedure.
34
With the adoption of the Law of July 2, 1972,35 the astreinte has
undergone a complete renewal. It may be considered as effective as
a money judgment can be for compelling specific performance of a:
contractual or other obligation. The judge may impose the astreinte
on party application or on his own initiative. He may either fix the
amount definitively or leave it open to redetermination upon liquida-
tion. The astreinte has now been statutorily characterized as a coercive
measure the amount of which is not in any sense restricted by the actual
damages suffered by the beneficiary of the astreinte.
The astreinte has, from its origin, been a discretionary technique
available to the judge to procure compliance with an obligation to
perform by the application of financial pressure. It is not, however, the
only means of applying such pressure practiced by the French legal
32. [1972] J.O.S. 1455; [1972] J.O.A.N. 3096.
33. [1972] J.O.S. 1367, remarks of M. Bellegou.
34. This attachment is exemplified in, e.g., Martin, Rdflexions sur rlnstruction du
Proc&s Civil, [1971] REv. DR. Cirv. 279.
35. Law no. 72-626 of 5 July 1972, instituant un juge de rex5cution et relative i
la reforme de la proc&Iure civile, arts. 5-8, [1972] J.O.L.D. 7181, ([1972] B.L.D. 362).
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system. A party to contract negotiations who is determined to obtain
performance rather than damages, and who is skeptical either of the
willingness of a judge to impose an astreinte or of its effectiveness, can
seek to include a penal clause in the contract.
II. PRIVATE COMPULSION: THE PENAL CLAUSE
The aversion to non-compensatory money judgments in civil liti-
gation which characterized the pre-1959 case law of the Court of
Cassation on astreintes, might have been expected equally to stimulate
strong resistance to the enforcement of contractual penalties, especially
in cases where the penal sum demanded was extravagant in relation to
actual damage. However, until 1975, the parties to a contract contain-
ing a penal clause could count on its being enforced without modifica-
tion and without regard to actual damage, if the clause were carefully
drawn and if the disappointed party were prepared to pursue the
matter all the way to the Court of Cassation.
The penal clause was legitimized and, somewhat ambiguously,
freed from the compensatory principle by nine articles of the Civil
Code, 1226 through 1233, which form a section entitled "Of Obligations
with Penal Clauses," to which must be added Article 1152 on agreed
damages. Article 1226 offers a definition which recognizes the coercive,
performance-oriented purpose of the penal clause. Article 1229 states
that the "penal clause is compensation [sic] for damages" resulting from
non-performance. In context this assertion is apparently intended to
explain why the creditor cannot have both compensatory damages (or
performance) and the penalty, except, of course, where the penalty
is payable for delay" in performance. The Article 1229 definition has
been relied upon by the doctrinal writers to link the penalty, as a form
of damages, to Article 1152's requirement that parties who have agreed
on damages be given precisely what they have agreed.80 The im-
mutability of the agreed penalty is also affirmed by negative implica-
tion in Article 1231 which provided, in the original text, "[tihe penalty
may be modified by the judge when the obligation has been partly
36. See, e.g., Chabas, Clause P6nale in (1971) J.C.C. at arts. 1146-51. Apparently
nothing has ever been made of the verbal distinction which the Code draws between
"damages" (dommages-intrits) and "penalties" (peines). The former expression Is used
in article 1152 (on agreed damages) and the latter in articles 1226-33 (on conventional
penalties). The two expressions have been treated as essentially equivalent. Id. Agree-
ment on the consequences of breach thus simply excludes operation of the compensatory
standards announced in articles 1146-51 and there is no separate legal regime for
penalties despite the apparent distinction suggested by the use of the two different
expressions in the Code.
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performed." The notion of part performance in Article 1231 will be
examined later. For the moment it need only be noted that this pro-
vision did not offer a substantial opportunity for judicial modification
of agreed penalties. In approving the penal clause and sheltering the
amount of the penalty from judicial scrutiny, the draftsmen of the
Code were faithful to the principle of freedom of contract expressed
in Article 1134"s celebrated declaration that "agreements lawfully en-
tered into make law for the parties." In so doing, the draftsmen de-
parted from the doctrine of Robert Pothier, whose writings so largely
dominated their work on obligations. Pothier, whose treatment of penal
clausess7 is otherwise substantially reproduced in these articles of the
Code, would have allowed the judge to substitute actual damages for
a manifestly excessive penalty. 8
The Court of Cassation has consistently held that penal clauses are
to be given full effect, however extravagant they may appear.2 9 Neither
the plaintiff's failure to prove actual damage4" nor considerations'of
"justice and equity"41 justifies refusal to enforce the full penalty. Force
majeure or impossibility might suffice to avoid the penalty on the
ground that performance of the principle obligation was thereby ex-
cused, but only where the parties clearly did not intend the penalty
to apply to every case in which the agreed performance was not ren-
dered.42 Article 1231, permitting reduction of the penalty where the
defendant had performed part of the obligation, provided relief in
some cases, but only where the parties themselves neither provided
for a scaling down of the penalty where the creditor had received
some value prior to default, nor made it clear that the full penalty was
payable notwithstanding part performance.43
It is difficult to assess the frequency of use of penal clauses prior
to the 1960's. If the penal clauses were in fact frequently used, they
may have provided an important alternative to the astreinte there-
by reducing concern over the practical deficiencies of the pre-1959
astreinte. In any event, contract penalties caused little concern and
37. 2 PoTrs-n, OEuvEs (OBLIGATONS) 173 (ed. 1861).
38. Id. at 179 (§ 345).
39. E.g., Mendouze et Alezais c. Mauron, (Cass.civ., 4 juin 1860) [1860] D.I. 257
and cases cited infra, notes 40 and 41.
40. Cf., S..r.1. R6seau T61phonique du Midi c. Sociht6 des entrep6ts mnnagers
(Cass.comm., 2 nov. 1967) [1967) Bull.Civ.IH 333.
41. Delacour c. Buffet (Cass.civ., 23 mai 1940) [1940] D. Jur. 161.
42. Supra note 36 at § 13, and, e.g., Belmondo c. Socikt6 Paris-film Production
(Cass.civ.5e, 26 nov. 1970) [1970] BulI.Civ. V. 538.
43. Mendouze et Alezais c. Mauron, supra note 39.
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were generally enforced. The law in this area was thrown into crisis
by the practice of the equipment leasing industry whose form contracts
generally included a sizeable penalty which became due upon can-
cellation for failure to pay rent.44 Defaulting lessees, commercial enter-
prises in most cases, attacked the clauses on every conceivable ground.
They were frequently successful before the lower courts, including
Courts of Appeal, producing a "judicial rebellion"4 against the case
law of the Court of Cassation.
The reaction of the lower courts was explainable by the extravagant
character of the equipment-lease penalty clauses of the late 1960's such
as the following:
[i]n case of non-performance by the lessee of his obligation, and
particularly in case of failure [to make required rental payments],
the lessor shall have the right to rescind the lease [upon notice]
by registered letter, and the lessee shall be bound to put the equip-
ment at the disposition of the lessor as provided [above] and, as
damages, hereby fixed in a single lump-sum, the total amount of
rents provided for the term of the contract shall become immedi-
ately due and payable subject only to the deduction of sums already
paid.4
6
Defaulting lessees searched codes, statutes, case law and doctrine for
resources with which to challenge penal clause orthodoxy and to resist
enforcement of these clauses.
The judicial response ranged from grudging enforcement of clauses,
which one court called "regrettably severe,"47 to invalidation of the
clause on the very dubious ground that it was a clause le'onine. The
three most serious arguments focused on the court's power to modify
44. The advent of "le leasing" (re-christened cridit-bail by a 1966 statute, Law
of 2 July 1966 relative aux enterprises pratiquant le cr6dit-bail, [1966] J.O.L.D. 5652
([1966] B.L.D. 287) and an early judicial decision concerning this form of financing
are described in Jusseaume, France: Le Leasing, 14 AM. J. Come. L. 685 (1960).
45. Alfandari, Le contrdle des clauses p~nales par le juge, [1971) J.C.P.1.2395, and
see e.g., Vend6me-6quipement Trans6co c. Conchou (Trib. Gd. Inst., Bergerac, 20
mars 1969) [1969] Gaz. Pal. 2.67; Locabail c. Gouts (Ct. App. Paris, 27 jan. 1970
[1970] J.C.P.I.16155; Nourry c. Locafrance (Ct. App. Paris, 27 juin 1970) [1970]
J.C.P.I.16376; Etab. Lucanes c. Soci6t6 Magneta T616phone (Ct. App. Paris, 4 mars
1971) [1972) D.I.582.
46. This clause appears in the lease examined by the Tribunal do Commerce of
Grenoble in Locabail c. Gouis, supra note 45.
47. Etab. Magenta c. Roquette (Trib. Comm. Versailles, 15 Jan. 1969) [1969]
Gaz. Pal. I. 158.
48. Vend8me-6quipement Trans~eo c. Conchou, supra note 45. A clause ldonine
is one which reserves the benefit of a bilateral contract to one party while imposing the
burden on the other. Only in the contract of soci6t4 (partnership) is the clause ldonine
expressly recognized as a basis of invalidity (see C.Civ. art. 1855) but the concept lis
occasionally been applied in other kinds of contracts.
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a penal clause under Article 1231, the prohibition against cumulating
penalty with damages or performance, and the concept of cause.
The first argument that a leasing contract was necessarily subject
to partial performance, and hence that its penal clause was within
reach of the moderating power conferred by Article 12314 caused
considerable concern to the leasing industry. The argument generated
a doctrinal response which attempted to show that the "nature" of
the leasing contract was such that it was "indivisible" and therefore
could not be partially performed.5° The Court of Cassation reaffirmed
its early decisions holding that Article 1231 was applicable only where
the parties themselves have failed to provide for the case of default
after part performance.5' After some hesitation,5 2 the Court also held
that the intention to exclude application of Article 1231 could be im-
plied where the amount of the penalty payable in the event of de-
fault declined as the period of performance lengthened.53 This was,
of course,. always the case with contracts which imposed a penalty
equal to the amount, or to some proportion of the amount, of the
unpaid rents.
The second argument concerning an alleged cumulation of penalty
with damages or performance was based on Articles 1184 and 1229 of
the Civil Code.54 Article 1184 implies the right to rescind for non-
performance in bilateral contracts and provides that the performing
party may either insist on performance by the other or demand" re-
scission with damages. It was argued that the lessor who obtained
rescission and thus recovered the leased equipment could not also
insist on performance of the penalty clause. This argument runs into
difficulty in Article 1229 which asserts that the penalty is a form of
damages. However, Article 1229 also declares that the penalty, as
49. See Locabail c. Gouis, supra note 45, and the note of M. B. Boccara which
accompanies the report in the J.C.P.
50. See Bey, Les aspects juridiques de la convention de cridit-bail immoblier, [1969]
J.C.P., 6dition Commerce et Industrie, L86634, and the note signed E.M.B. accompany-
ing Garrigues c. Locafrance (Ct. App. Toulouse, 8 mai 1970) [1970] J.C.P.1.16481.
51. Mendouze et Alezais c. Mauron, supra note 39.
52. In several cases, the Court of Cassation indicated that the lower courts
interpretation of the contract - as to whether the application of art. 1231 had been
excluded by agreement - was not subject to review. See, e.g., Socit6 T616phonique
Europieme c. Pemot (Cass.comm. 3 nov. 1969) [1970] J.CP.I.16376 and the ups
and downs of Poirson c. Lenoir (Cass.civ.3e, 29 nov. 1972) [1972] Bull. Civ.II 473
[1974D.2] described in the note signed Ph. M. which accompanies the report in the
Recueil Dalloz.
53. Locafrance c. Nourry (Cass.comm. 4 juillet 1972) (1972] D.I.728.
54. Boccara, Note to J.C.P. report of Zysmana c. Soci6t6 do Transports Soradis (Ct.
App. Rouen, 3 juillet 1970) [1970] J.C.P.I.16581.
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damages, could not be recovered if execution was also required. It was
indicative of the intensity of judicial revulsion against the equipment-
lease penal clauses, that one lessee-defendant was able to persuade the
Court of Appeals of Paris that the lessor was both recovering the
penalty and obtaining performance because the amount of the penalty
was-measured by the rent remaining due."
The third argument focuses on the concept of cause. The mysteries
of the doctrine of cause in French contract law cannot be explored here,
but the several aspects of the theory of cause which came into play
in the equipment-lease penal clause controversy merit brief attention.
First, there was the lessee's appeal to the doctrine of unjust enrichment
- nowhere provided for in the general terms by the Civil Code but
firmly established in the case law - to attack the penal clause. 0 Cause
was critical in the defeat of this most obvious line of attack. The kind
of enrichment with which the French doctrine is concerned is not
unjust enrichment but rather enrichment without cause which, in most
cases, amounts'to the same thing.57 But in attacking either the penal
clause or the astreinte an argument of unjust enrichment runs afoul
of cause because in each case a classic cause - the contract in the
one, and the judgment in the other - is present.5 8
Secondly, it was asserted that the obligation to pay the penalty
was deprived of the indispensible cause by recovery of the leased
equipment.5 9 Cause in this context is closely analogous to consideration
in Anglo-American law. Thus, the argument amounts to the following:
the consideration for each rental payment was a certain period of usage
of the leased object and thus consideration failed as to all subsequent
periods when the leased equipment was repossessed. The difficulty, of
course, was that the leasing contracts did not so provide; if some did,
the forms were easily modified.
Apart from some hesitation over the application of Article 1231,
the Court of Cassation held firmly to the immutability and full en-
55. St6 T616phonie Europ6enne c. Pernot (companion case to Nourry c. Locafrance)
see note 45. See also France-Bail c. Bez (Cass.comm. 30 avril 1974) 1976 J.C.P.I.18282,
rejecting this argument.
56. Only one reported case has been found in which this argument was made, and
it was rejected, Etab. Magenta c. Roquette, supra note 47. The argument is developed
briefly here only because the Common Law rejection of penalties is in part founded on
aversion to the unmerited enrichment of the party recovering the penalty.
57. See MAnTY et RAYNAuD, supra note 1, at 316-17.
58. Id.
59. The principal proponent of the absence of cause argument was Boccara. See his
note, supra note 54, and his note to the J.C.P. report of Locabail c. Gouds, supra note
49. This thesis was accepted by the Paris Court of Appeals in St6 T61ephonie Europ6enne
c. Pernot, supra note 55.
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forceability of penal clauses throughout the period of controversy run-
ing from the late 1960's until Articles 1152 and 1231 were modified by
legislation introduced by private member bill, again authored by Jean
Foyer,60 and adopted in July 1975.1 The amendments did not disturb
Article 1152's prohibition of a damage award in an amount different
from any amount agreed upon by the parties, but added the following
qualification: "Nevertheless, the judge may reduce or increase the
agreed penalty, if it is manifestly excessive or derisory. Any stipulation
to the contrary shall have no effect."62 Article 1231 was completely
recast to read as follows:
When the undertaking has been partly performed, the agreed
penalty may be reduced by the judge in proportion to the bene-
fit procured to the creditor by the partial performance, without
prejudice to the application of Article 1152. Any stipulation to the
contrary shall have no effect.63
The new texts clearly mark the abandonment of the rigid enforcement
of penal clauses which has for so long been a distinctive characteristic
of French contract law. It seems likely, however, that the texts them-
selves will cause difficulty for it is far from clear precisely what man-
date is now given to the judge who is called upon to enforce a contract
penalty. There is no doubt that the new -Article 1231 overturns the
Court of Cassation's ruling that the parties can by agreement preclude
application of the moderating power of the judge. Article 1231, as well
as the new language in Article 1152, has been made a matter of ordre
public.
Unless extensive interpretation and application of the modifying
power granted by the amended Article 1152 preempts, as it well may,
the power granted by new Article 1231, revival of doctrinal controversy
in respect of part performance appears highly likely. The principal
difficulty presented by the amended texts, however, lies in the inter-
pretation of the standard for the exercise of the moderating power
accorded by the amendments to Article 1152.
It seems clear both textually and from the legislative history that
the new language was not intended to reduce the penal clause to a
liquidated damage provision of greatly diminished coercive power. The
reporter for the Senate committee which examined the bill affirmed
60. Proposition de Loi, A.N. Doe. no. 1365, Premi&e session ordinaire do 1974-75.
61. Law no. 75-597 of 9 July 1975 modiflant les arts. 1152 et 1231 clu code civil
sur Ia clause p6nale, 1975 J.O.L.D.7076 ([1975] B.L.D.240).
62. Id., art. 2.
63. Id., art. 1. The new texts are extensively commented upon in Boc.ara, La R&
forme de la Clause Pinale, [1975] J.C.P.11. 2742.
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that "it seems useful... to maintain the penal clause.. .which has a
salutary coercive effect"64 and considered that the proposed amend-
ments did not destroy that utility. The text added to Article 1152 tends
to confirm this view for it permits, but does not require, the judge to
modify the penalty in cases in which he finds it to be "manifestly
excessive" (manifestement excessif). The power accorded the judge
to increase a "derisory" penalty is troublesome if the interpreter views
the text symmetrically in light of a single purpose - the protection of
penal clauses aimed at inducing performance through greater-than-
actual-damage recovery, for it is difficult to imagine upward revision
to an amount in excess of actual damage. 5 One can nevertheless con-
ceive of the use of this power to overcome a penalty clause or agreed
damage clause which has the effect of under-compensating actual
damage. The legislative history confirms this as the purpose of this
segment of the amendment to Article 1152..00 The remainder of the
amendment, clearly indicates, especially in light of the draftsmen's
particular concern with lease penalties, that the moderating power
established by the amendment to Article 1152 was intended to avoid
"overkill" rather than to eliminate penalties" altogether by imposing
an actual damage rule.
With this objective established, the new language of Article 1152
leaves the parties at the mercy of almost wholly unguided judicial
discretion. The same penalty may be viewed as "manifestly excessive"
where it far surpasses provable damage, but, it may appear wholly
reasonable if one attempts retrospectively to assess an appropriate
penalt level for the purpose of inducing a strong preference for per-
formance on the part of the obligor. A court sufficiently imbued with
the sanctity of contracts might prefer to examine the clause in light of
the circumstances known to the parties when they enter into the con-
tract. However, when the clause is litigated it will already have failed
in its coercive purpose and actual damages will, in principle, be de-
terminable. The temptation will become strong to evaluate the penalty
in light of that determination and of the circumstances of breach. The
Italian Civil Code, Article 1384 of which employs the notion of "mani-
64. Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des lois etc., A.N. Doe. no. 1603, Sccondo
session ordinaire de 1974-75, at 6.
65. There is, however, one case in which a theatre succeeded in persuading the court
to demand damages in excess of the agreed penalty. There an actor refused to perform,
but was willing to pay the agreed penalty. The court characterized this conduct as wilful.
Soci6t6 des com6diens frangais c. Giraud (Cass.civ.4 f6v. 1969) [1969] D.601 ([1969
J.C.P.II.16030). But the case is more nearly the French tort of abuse of right than a
case which turns on the actual penalty.
66. [1975) J.O.S. 1746, remarks of M. Leeanuet, Minister of Justice.
Issue COMPELLING CONTRACT PERFORMANCE IN FRANCE 109
fest excess" to direct judicial discretion in the reduction of penalties,
provides further that the court must also consider the "interest which
the creditor has in j6iffdrmance."67 Even that modest additional guid-
ance is withheld in the French text. Moreover, even if the penalty is
found manifestly excessive, its reduction remains a discretionary matter.
Standards may be easier to work out at that stage. The bad faith of
the obligor in withholding performance might be pertinent, but it is
difficult to imagine that any sharp distinction will be drawn in practice
between the evaluation of the excessive or reasonable character of the
penalty and the decision to adjust its amount.
The doctrinal effort to add flesh to the extended skeleton of Article
1152 has begun. One can already see the plain meaning of the word
"manifestly" (manifestement) cracking under the strain of doctrinal
elaboration. In the first extended study of the revised texts to appear
in the law journals, 8 Bruno Boccara offers a schema which divides
penalties into three kinds: those which are a damage substitute,
those which merely (simplement) exceed actual damage and those
which are manifestly excessive. Only the last category falls within the
moderating power of the judge under Article 1152. But the diction-
ary says that manifestement means "obviously" or "evidently."09 That,
according to Boccara, cannot be the statutory meaning. To accom-
plish the legislative purpose the word must be taken to mean "out
of proportion" (dgmesur6) in the context of Article 1152.-0 Boccara gets
into this exercise in an effort to work a safe harbor into the text for the
penalty which exceeds actual damages and is therefore "excessive" in
that regard but which is not excessive as a performance-inducing de-
vice. He accomplishes that task more persuasively through reliance on
the legislative history7" than he does by attempting to graft a graduated
scale of "excessiveness" onto Article 1152. One would have thought that
manifestement, true to its ordinary meaning, merely requires that the
court resolve doubtful cases- against decision, leaving whole the prob-
67. Article 1384 of the Italian Civil Code provides:
The penalty may be reduced equitably by the judge if the principal obligation
has been partly performed or if the amount of the penalty is manifestly ex-
cessive, having regard to the interest which the creditor has in obtaining
performance.
Professor Corla argues that the "excessiveness" of the penalty should be judged in re-
lation to the purpose of procuring performance and not that of satisfaction or reparation
of damage. 2 GoaRLA, IL Co'rTRro, 258 (1954).
68. See Boccara, supra note 63.
69. ROBERT, DICTIONNAmE ALPHABDTIQUE & ANALOGiQUE nE .A Luwcu FxNCxSrA
1038 (1970).
70. BoccARA, supra note 63 at §§ 23-24.
71. Id. at § 22.
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lern of finding a suitable standard for distinguishing excessive from
non-excessive penalties. Be that as it may, Boccara probably is nearest
the mark, as a practical matter, when he observes that it is "to be feared
that the Court of Cassation will consider this notion of manifest excess
... as [a matter within] the sovereign [unreviewable] appreciation of
the judges of fact [juges du fond]. -' Even if the Court of Cassation
decides to get into the business of elaborating a standard for the exer-
cise of the modifying power of Article 1152, it can scarcely do more
than direct the lower court judges to insure that the amount of the
penalty is fixed at a level which, in their estimation, would have been
an appropriate and reasonable deterrent to breach by the party subject
to the penalty under the circumstances. Since any penalty that is the
object of an action for collection was necessarily insufficient to procure
performance, the judge confronts a dilemma. He knows that the plain-
tiff in fact underestimated the amount of the penalty required to stimu-
late performance by the defendant, assuming that an adequate penalty
would have compelled performance. The judge can then only aggravate
the plaintiff's underestimation by further reducing the penalty. The
result is likely to have less to do with the deterrent function of the
penal clause than with the judge's subjective response to the question
how much this defendant should be punished over and above liability
for actual damage in light of all the circumstances. The penal clause
would thus become a mechanism authorizing the judge to impose
punitive damages otherwise unknown to French civil law, except to
the extent that the astreinte may be so regarded. The creation of that
authority by contract certainly heightens the risk incurred by the
party who fails to perform, but that risk is necessarily less dissuasive
than was the almost certain enforcement of the penalty under the
prior law. The degree of risk, and consequently, its coercive force, will
depend not upon standards formulated by the Court of Cassation but
upon the practice of the lower courts.
M. CONCLUSION
The principal means of compelling or inducing specific performance
of contractual obligations in France xemain those whose ultimate sanc-
tion is the money judgment recoverable by the party seeking perform-
ance. For a time, in the 1950's, when the astreinte had reached its
nadir, the penal clause in the contract was the only method by which
a money judgment adequate to deter breach could credibly be threat-
72. Id. at § 31.
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ened against a party willing to face a judgment based on provable
damage. In ruling on the penal clause the amount of the penalty was
beyond the control of the judge while, in the case of the astreinte,
the amount was to be determined by him. However, in the astreinte,
the judge's ability to use the threat of a money judgment to coerce
performance was restricted by the duty ultimately to assess only prov-
able damage. The last few years have seen a major shift in this struc-
ture. The judge's power to control that part of the liability in excess of
the actual damage resulting from the obligor's failure to perform under
a contract containing a penal clause has been vastly biugmented while
his ability to achieve approximately the same result in the absence of
a penal clause has been restored through the rehabilitation of the
astreinte.
This evolution has been largely motivated by a desire to insure the
ability of the courts to order performance, and by concern over certain
apparent abuses of the penal clause. Through it all the most surprising
element for the observer accustomed to the Common Law approach to
such matters is the relatively low level of concern with the unmerited
enrichment of the promisee which is inherent in both devices. A legal
system which claims to be opposed in principle to private penalties
and to the introduction of penal elements in civil litigation might be
expected to seek other solutions to the contract performance problem.
That the French system has not done so is perhaps only to be
explained (if one refuses to take M. Bellegou's "paradox" at face value)
by the traditional antagonism between the citizen and rltat (better
my opponent recover the penalty than that it go to the State), and by
the profoundly rooted belief that a civil action is the parties' affair
and not the State's: l'action est la chose des parties, a notion which
permeates French civil procedure and can perhaps be traced into this
area of remedial law.
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